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Abstract
Human artifacts lie on the interface between their inner environments and their outer envi-
ronments. Organizations, therefore, are apt subjects to be studied through a science of the
artificial. Furthermore, organizational design happens at two interfaces: first, at the inter-
face between organizational founder(s) and the firms they design, and second, between
the firms and the environments in which they operate. We use recent developments in the
study of entrepreneurial expertise to show why an effectual logic of design is necessary at
the first interface, and what its consequences are for designing at the second. In particu-
lar, we use the exemplar case of Starbucks to codify three key characteristics of the design
problem at the first interface — namely, Knightian uncertainty, goal ambiguity and envi-
ronmental isotropy. We then use an ‘alternate histories’ method to trace four strategic
options — namely, planning, adaptation, vision and transformation — for designing at the
second interface. In the final analysis, organizational design is important because effectu-
ators using transformational approaches not only design organizations, but concurrently
end up designing the environments we live in.
Keywords: science of the artificial, effectuation, isotropy, uncertainty, goal ambiguity,
Starbucks
In 1969, Simon had suggested a new class of sciences called ‘sciences of the
artificial’ where the notion of design would be central to our academic endeav-
ors. In 1981, in a bold polemic that challenged the abdication of prescriptive
theorizing by management scholars, Starbuck and Nystrom made a case for
‘why the world needs organizational design’ (Starbuck and Nystrom 1981). The
latter called for, as a pressing need, what the former had suggested as an inter-
esting and viable option. This paper is an attempt to contribute to the continu-
ing efforts by scholars in this tradition (Boland and Collopy 2004; Dunbar and
Starbuck 2006; Romme 2003).
A science of the artificial (or an artifactual science) studies some subset of
human artifacts. An artifactual science of entrepreneurship, therefore, would
include the study of new organizations, new markets and new institutions as arti-
facts fabricated by human beings. In this regard, we posit effectuation as an
entrepreneurial logic for designing artifacts, consisting of a coherent set of prin-
ciples grounded in expert entrepreneurial practice (Sarasvathy 2001). Very much
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studies, the principles we present in this paper are drawn from extensive 
empirical work (Thomas and Tymon 1982; Van Aken 2004). In particular our
exposition draws upon two studies of entrepreneurial expertise, one investigating
the formation of new firms (Sarasvathy 1998) and the other that of new markets
(Dew 2003). Together they show how the designers of organizations end up
designing the world we live in.
The upshot of our argument may be captured in two contrasting metaphors
about the formation of new firms and new markets. Most strategic management
and organizational studies take the environment or market as given and then
examine the actions and responses of managers and organizations within these.
Even entrepreneurship research, for the most part, takes markets and market
opportunities as given and seeks to explain how and why certain entrepreneurs
are able to find these and build successful firms based upon these (Shane and
Venkataraman 2000). The dominant paradigm here evokes decision theories
that use a causal logic focussed on prediction, where the task is that of uncov-
ering the billion-dollar opportunity in the jigsaw puzzle of the environment. In
the jigsaw puzzle metaphor the market opportunity already exists and the role
of entrepreneurship is primarily one of discovering and combining the right
pieces — to design to fit rather than to design to transform existing environ-
ments. Yet studies of expert entrepreneurs and early histories of new firms and
new markets show that, irrespective of whether they saw themselves as discov-
erers or visionaries, the designers of these artifacts did not in actual fact behave
as though the picture were already there.1 Instead, they proceeded more like an
accomplished quilter. Quilting differs from solving the jigsaw puzzle in at least
three ways. First, the quilter has wider latitude in putting together the initial pat-
tern. Even when she begins with a basket of random patches handed to her, she
can choose colors and juxtapositions that she personally finds pleasing and
meaningful. Second, large quilting projects are usually communal; a good quil-
ter works with others who bring their own baskets of patches and tastes and tal-
ents; in the process she has to manage various problems of coordination as well
as deal with unexpected contingencies. Finally, the quilt not only has to be
pleasing and meaningful to the quilters engaged in the enterprise, it has to be
useful in the world — to keep human bodies warm. The contrasting metaphor
of the patchwork quilt with that of a jigsaw puzzle captures in essence the dif-
ference between an effectual logic of transformational design as opposed to a
causal logic of predictive and adaptive design.
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin by summarizing Simon’s prescrip-
tions for a science of the artificial. In particular, we will focus on his statement
that the artifact lies on the interface between its inner environment and its outer
environment, and highlight his point that good design reshapes the two envi-
ronments in ways that work well and create value in the world. The third sec-
tion examines the nature of the entrepreneurial design situation, articulated
through the example of Starbucks. We then describe how the logic of effectua-
tion accomplishes the design of artifacts. Then we compare the effectual
process with three alternatives — predictive, adaptive and visionary — by con-
structing alternative (imagined) histories for Starbucks. The final section closes
with research implications.
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The Centrality of Design in a Science of the Artificial
Simon included in the sciences of the artificial the study of those ‘objects and
phenomena in which human purpose as well as natural law are embodied’.
(Simon 1996: 6). He defined the boundaries for sciences of the artificial as fol-
lows (Simon 1996):
1 Artificial things are synthesized (though not always or usually with full
forethought) by humans.
2 Artificial things may imitate appearances in natural things while lacking, in
one or many respects, the reality of the latter.
3 Artificial things can be characterized in terms of functions, goals,
adaptation.
4 Artificial things are often discussed, particularly when they are being
designed, in terms of imperatives as well as descriptives.
In short, artifacts are fabrications, they exhibit behavior, and they are often
described, rightly or wrongly, in intentional terms. He also defined an arti-
fact as a boundary (interface) between an inner environment and an outer
one:
‘An artifact can be thought of as a meeting point — an “interface” in today’s terms,
between an “inner” environment and an “outer” environment, the surroundings in which
it operates. Notice that this way of viewing artifacts applies equally well to many things
that are not man-made — to all things in fact that can be regarded as adapted to some
situation; and in particular it applies to the living systems that have evolved through the
forces of organic evolution’ (Simon 1996: 9).
There are two key elements in Simon’s conception of an artifactual science.
The first is that the interest is in human artifacts. It is for this reason that a field
such as myrmecology (the study of ants) is not an artifactual science, even
though ants build artifacts, namely, ant heaps. The second element has to do
with the relationship between artifacts and natural laws. Simon repeatedly
emphasized that natural laws constrain, but do not dictate, the fabrication of
artifacts. That is, it is possible to design artifacts. The general thrust of this argu-
ment inspired a generation of scholars who have built on this Simonian tradi-
tion (Boland and Collopy 2004; Dunbar and Starbuck 2006; Nelson and
Stolterman 2003; Romme 2003).
The social sciences often cope with the wild complexity of human behavior,
by denying both the relevance and reality of natural laws that are embodied in
human behavior as well as the importance of the human handprint in making the
world. Such coping mechanisms take a variety of forms. Some theories distance
themselves from the annoying human element. For example, Behaviorism, in its
fundamentalist incarnations, denies the relevance of human purpose in under-
standing human behavior. Similarly, ‘Pure Sociology’ dreams of a theory char-
acterized by the ‘presence of several absences: ideology, teleology, psychology,
and people’ (Black 2000). Other theories undervalue the constraints imposed by
natural laws. For example, standard rationality models in neoclassical econom-
ics ignore the limitations biology imposes on human cognition. Then there are
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theories that attempt to reduce all aspects of human action to natural laws. For
example, sociobiology (Wilson 1980) and structuralism (Mayhew 1980) in
sociology, and automaticity (Kirsch and Lynn 1999; Wegner 2003) in psychol-
ogy come to mind. It is not uncommon to justify the lack of realism by as-if
arguments. (See the very influential essay by Friedman (1953), Simon (1959)
for a rebuttal, and Vaihinger (1925) for other as-if arguments.)
Consequently, every social science lives under the threat of potential sub-
sumption by some other more ‘physical’ science. Thus, anthropology in the
Durkeim/Geertz tradition is under attack from evolutionary psychology (Tooby
and Cosmides 1992), psychology awaits subsumption by neuroscience
(LeDoux 1996; Horgan 1999), political science is threatened with models from
economics (Friedman 1953), and neoclassical economics faces the onslaught of
‘econophysics’ (Mantegna and Stanley 2000) and ‘neuroeconomics’ (Glimcher
2003).
In a prescient comment, Simon suggests that the problem has a deeper cause:
‘The previous chapters have shown that a science of artificial phenomena is always in
imminent danger of dissolving and vanishing. The peculiar properties of the artifact lie
on the thin interface between the natural laws within it and the natural laws without.
What can we say about it? What is there to study besides the boundary sciences — those
that govern the means and the task environment?’ (Simon 1996: 113)
The question is a rhetorical one. Simon’s answer is that:
‘The proper study of those who are concerned with the artificial is the way in which that
adaptation of means to environments is brought about — and central to that is the
process of design itself.’ (Simon 1996: 113)
Simon’s shift in emphasis from the complexities of human behavior to design
is a shift from as-if models to even-if models. Thus, even-if human behavior is
complex, the design principles (if any) behind artifacts may well be simple;
even-if the future may be unpredictable, the logic for designing organizations
may be systematic; and so on. His prescience in this regard has recently been
borne out in studies of how entrepreneurs transform extant realities to create
new firms and new markets (Sarasvathy 1998; Dew 2003). However, before
articulating the results of these studies, it will be useful to focus on the design
problem in greater detail.
The Design Problem for Entrepreneurs
‘Rational choice involves two guesses,’ wrote Jim March in the Bell Journal of
Economics (March 1978: 587), ‘a guess about uncertain future consequences,
and a guess about uncertain future preferences.’ The first ‘guess’ has been
widely studied in the area of decision making under uncertainty; and Jim
March and others have examined the second ‘guess’ through studies of goal
ambiguity (March 1982). But the design problem for entrepreneurs also
involves a third dimension — environmental isotropy (no a priori limit to what
information is relevant to it) — that needs further elaboration, particularly in
light of organizational design.
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Given the unpredictability of the future and in the absence of pre-existent
goals, one explanation that has been proposed for the creation of successful
innovating firms is through natural selection, the action of the independent envi-
ronment in selecting among random variations in the behaviors of firms
(Hannan and Freeman 1977; Nelson and Winter 1982). But the existence of an
independent selection mechanism such as the market has also been questioned
by a variety of scholars, including Weick (1979) and Child (1972). These three
problem elements constitute the central question formulated by Sarasvathy and
Simon (2000):
‘Where do we find rationality when the environment does not independently influence
outcomes or even rules of the game (Weick 1979), the future is truly unpredictable
(Knight 1921), and the decision maker is unsure of his/her own preferences (March
1982)?’
The Origins of Starbucks
Take the case of Starbucks. Using some of the prevailing theoretical lenses to
analyze the origins of Starbucks, we could tell a story somewhat as Koehn
(Koehn 2001) tells it:
• Howard Schultz built Starbucks into a nationally known brand name. How
did he do that?
• He recognized that baby boomers began rejecting processed and pre-
packaged foods in favor of more ‘natural’ and higher quality foods and 
beverages.
• Americans were becoming more interested in a higher level of service than
was generally available in most retail outlets.
• Schultz used this understanding of the changing demand side — in tandem
with a range of operating policies — to develop premium coffee products
and appealing retail environments.
However, her own narrative, as Koehn reports the details of the case, sug-
gests a more complex reality than a visionary entrepreneur who recognizes a
great opportunity and exploits it with ruthless efficiency. Instead, consider
the following:
• By the 1980s, per capita coffee consumption in the United States,
which was based largely on supermarket sales of one-pound cans from
Maxwell House and other mass marketers, had been declining for 20
years.
• The original Starbucks was founded in 1971 by Gordon Bowker, Jerry
Baldwin and Zev Siegl. It consisted of a shop in Seattle’s Pike Place Market
that sold roasted quality beans, along with tea, spices and supplies; it did not
sell coffee by the cup.
• As Schultz himself states, ‘But the founders of Starbucks were not studying
market trends. They were filling a need — their own need — for quality cof-
fee.’ Koehn agrees with this.
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• Even Bowker et al. were not the first to ‘discover’ the specialty coffee 
market — Alfred Peet, the Dutch coffee connoisseur, had been at it since
1966. And it appears likely there may have been others before him.
• Schultz, unlike Peet or Bowker et al., was not a coffee aficionado. As Koehn
(Koehn 2001: 219) puts it, ‘Like most Americans in the early 1980s, he had
grown up thinking of coffee as a commodity purchased along the inner
aisles of supermarkets.’ He was an executive with the housewares supplier,
Hammerplast, whose clients included the original Starbucks company.
Based on the above facts, how can we theoretically understand the develop-
ment of the specialty coffee market, or the creation of Starbucks as we know it
today, either in terms of current theories such as opportunity recognition, insti-
tutional entrepreneurship, or evolutionary/co-evolutionary processes? How can
we understand the micro-foundations, i.e. the decisions and actions at the entre-
preneurial level, that drive the processes of organizational design?
Was there a market for Starbucks irrespective of Schultz’s actions? Taking
into account the data available in 1981, could Schultz have reasonably predicted
the emergence of the speciality coffee market? It seems not. Here is data on
‘market feedback’ that suggests otherwise:
‘During the next two decades [1960s and 1970s], the large roasters continued to spend
huge advertising budgets fighting for shares in a shrinking market. Per capita coffee
consumption began to fall in the mid-1960s, declining from a postwar peak of 3.1 cups
per day in 1963 to less than 2 cups in the mid-1980s. Americans, especially teenagers
who had historically drunk coffee, increasingly consumed other beverages, especially
soft drinks such as Coke and Pepsi. By the late 1980s, about half the US population
over the age of ten did not consume coffee. Long the nation’s number one beverage
(excluding tap water), coffee had dropped to a distant second behind soft drinks.’
(Koehn 2001: 213)
Yet at the same time, other data exist that presents a different picture. Consider
how Schultz actually built his first coffee bar, Il Giornale, which was later
merged with the original Starbucks in 1987:
‘The entrepreneur and his team listened carefully to patrons and each other in the months
after Il Giornale opened. Consumers, they discovered, did not like nonstop opera music.
Those interested in lingering in the store desired chairs. Some asked for flavored coffee.
A menu printed primarily in Italian was not accessible to many people. The baristas’ bow
ties were uncomfortable to wear and difficult to keep looking neat after hours in front of
the espresso machine.
‘Schultz considered each of these issues. He wanted to please consumers. But he had to
do so in a way that was consistent with the offerings and distinct identity that he was try-
ing to create. He adjusted many operating policies in response to customer and employee
feedback. Il Giornale began providing chairs and playing more varied music. The baris-
tas stopped wearing ties. “We fixed a lot of mistakes,” Schultz said. But he decided not
to honor some requests. For example, although the larger market for vanilla, hazelnut,
and other artificially flavored beans was growing rapidly, the company consistently
refused to sell coffee brewed from them. Schultz believed the practice would compro-
mise his organization’s commitment to selling an authentic, high-quality product and
thus its brand’s developing image.’ (Koehn 2001)
So the story of Starbucks, like the story of many enterprises, is full of feedback
from the so-called ‘market’ that, from an ex post perspective, may or may not have
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proved useful or wise ex ante. The confusion inherent in the information available
to Schultz does not consist only in the profusion of market feedback. It extends to
feedback from other stakeholders including investors, employees and strategic
partners. For example, while the founders of the original Starbucks would not
agree to convert their enterprise into an Italian-style coffee bar business, they did
offer him seed money and advice to found Il Giornale. Similarly, of the 242 men
and women he approached for funding, 217 decided not to fund the venture, but
quite a few did purchase equity. Here again we see that the overwhelming picture
is one of mixed information that may or may not be relevant, a concept known as
‘isotropy’.
Isotropy refers to the fact that in decisions and actions involving uncer-
tain future consequences it is not always clear ex ante which pieces of
information are worth paying attention to and which are not. The problem
has been studied by cognitive scientists, roboticists and philosophers of
mind. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains Fodor’s definition
of the problem as follows: ‘For the difficulty now is one of determining
what is and isn’t relevant. Fodor’s claim is that when it comes to circum-
scribing the consequences of an action, just as in the business of theory
confirmation in science, anything could be relevant’ (Fodor 1983: 105).
There are no a priori limits to the properties of the ongoing situation that
might come into play.
Isotropy is a problem even when the future is relatively predictable and the
goals are clear. When they are not, as is often the case in design projects such
as startup enterprises, isotropy is a truly vexing problem as we saw in the details
of designing Starbucks.
Three Elements of the Entrepreneurial Design Space
In sum, three elements constitute the design space for entrepreneurs:
1 Knightian uncertainty: it is impossible to calculate probabilities for future
consequences.
2 Goal ambiguity: preferences are neither given nor well ordered.
3 Isotropy: it is not clear what elements of the environment to pay attention to
and what to ignore.
Let us re-examine Schultz’s decisions and actions in designing Starbucks in
terms of the three elements above.
1 How could he calculate the probabilities for the outcomes of his actions?
2 Did he really know what he wanted to achieve? If so, were his goals
clear?
3 How could he know which elements of feedback from customers and others
to pay attention to and which to ignore?
We have already accumulated facts from the case to show that (1) and (3) were
real problems in his case. How about (2)? In many places, both in Koehn’s expo-
sition and his own words, Schultz comes across as the quintessential visionary
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— someone who knew exactly what he wanted, had the vision to perceive the
enormous opportunity Starbucks offered and went after it and made it happen.
But even if we accept it as fact that from day one he ‘saw’ an opportunity and
was clear he wanted to build a national business of some sort, it still was not clear
whether it would be a chain of retail stores that sell specialty coffee, or coffee-
houses in the restaurant model, or something in between for which there were as
yet no clear models. The list of isotropic problems goes on. Should he build
Starbucks as a franchise or not? Should he retain the name Il Giornale or
Starbucks? And the farther we go back into the origins of the enterprise, to the
decisions/actions that drive the so-called ‘opportunity recognition’ process, the
more uncertain, ambiguous and isotropic the problem space appears.
Schultz’s own description of his initial decision to leave Hammerplast and go
to work for the original Starbucks evokes a Marchian tapestry — i.e. a throng
of preferences and passions jostling on the mental trading floor — rather than a
well-ordered army marching to the command of goal clarity (Schultz and Yang
1997: 36–37):
‘On the five-hour plane trip back to New York the next day, I couldn’t stop thinking about
Starbucks. It was like a shining jewel. I took one sip of the watery airline coffee and
pushed it away. Reaching into my briefcase, I pulled out the bag of Sumatra beans,
opened the top, and sniffed. I leaned back, and my mind started wandering.
‘I believe in destiny. In Yiddish, they call it bashert. At that moment, flying 35,000 feet
above the earth, I could feel the tug of Starbucks. There was something about it, a pas-
sion and authenticity I had never experienced in business.
‘Maybe, just maybe, I could be part of that magic. Maybe I could help it grow. How
would it feel to build a business? How would it feel to own equity, not just collect a pay-
check? What could I bring to Starbucks that could make it even better than it was? The
opportunities seemed as wide open as the land I was flying over.’
The story he tells is, of course, subject to retrospective bias. It may or may
not be apocryphal. But the fact remains that he did quit Hammerplast and join
Starbucks. Even if his vision were in actual fact any less clear than he reports,
that would only strengthen our argument about goal ambiguity. And if it were
any more clear, there is no reason why he would not report it that way; he
appears to have no problem asserting his ‘vision’ in other places.
It is also important to note that Starbucks, ultimately, is a success story. So
there is a tendency both for the subject involved (Schultz) and the scholars
reporting on him, to retrospectively describe his actions as prescient, resolute
and discerning. If it had turned out that he failed in his venture, we would be
tempted to describe those same actions as reckless, stubborn and foolish. And
this is exactly the problem ex ante, both for designers of organizations and those
of us studying them.
What advice can we give someone faced with a problem space characterized
by Knightian uncertainty, goal ambiguity and isotropy? It might appear that all
we can tell them is to make their best guess about future events, use trial and
error, have faith in their vision or trust their intuition to persist with the oppor-
tunity they perceive, and build charismatic leadership skills that enable them to
convince others to follow through to eventual success. But is this really the best
we can do?
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An Effectual Logic
Could there be a way to act within the design space identified above that is 
neither ‘rational’ in the traditional sense nor a ‘deviation’ from rational behav-
ior? What is required is a way to pluralize the concept of rationality with a logic
of action that is appropriate in the space of Knightian uncertainty, goal 
ambiguity and environmental isotropy. It is clear that such a logic has to be non-
predictive (i.e. not taking the event space for probabilities as given and
immutable), non-teleological (i.e. not taking preferences and goals as pre-exis-
tent or unchangeable) and non-adaptive (i.e. not taking the environment as
exogenous or as something to respond to and ‘fit’ with).
Effectuation has been posed as one logic that ‘works’ in this space (Sarasvathy
2001). It might be thought of as a set of design rules that are appropriate for this
situation (Van Aken 2004; Romme 2003). Several studies have outlined the key
elements of effectuation in detail (Sarasvathy and Dew 2005a, b; Sarasvathy,
2007). Here we limit ourselves to a condensed summary.
Effectuation starts from the position that the future is contingent upon actions
by willful agents intersubjectively seeking to reshape the world and fabricate
new ones. The essential characteristic of the future, in this view, is its unpre-
dictability. Environments can be made stable and predictable for limited periods
of time in certain areas. But these periods of stability tend to be ‘artificial’
exceptions designed by human action rather than the ‘natural’ regularity of a
causal universe (Carney and Gedajlovic 2002). Normatively speaking, there-
fore, human action should seek to leverage both regularities and contingencies
to create novelty through effectual interaction.
Effectuation begins with means available to the effectuators. There are three
categories of means available to all human beings and can be simply described
as: (1) Who I am (the stable traits, abilities and attributes of the effectuator); (2)
What I know (his/her education, experience and expertise); (3) Whom I know
(his/her social networks). The effectuator’s pool of resources (i.e. ‘What I have’)
can be computed as a function of these three categories of means. The funda-
mental agenda for the effectuator then becomes: What effects can I create, given
who I am, what I know, and whom I know? The effectuator begins by imagining
several possible courses of action, the consequences of which are for the most
part unpredictable. Courses of action are typically co-determined by stakehold-
ers who are willing to commit resources to particular actions (Sarasvathy and
Dew 2005b). In general, stakeholders not only provide resources, they also set
immediate agendas and generate new sub-goals for the venture. The focus of the
entire decision-making process for each individual involved is on what can be
done, given who s/he is, what s/he knows, and whom s/he knows. This approach
highlights the positive potential of surprises, the ‘Aha!’ feeling that the creativ-
ity literature talks about (Wallace and Gruber 1992). Effectual artifacts (whether
firm or market or organization or institution) may take on shapes that are unan-
ticipated and sometimes even unimagined by the stakeholders whose commit-
ments engender it (Hagedoorn and Duysters 2002).
Since outcomes to novelty are by definition unpredictable, commitments by
entrepreneur and stakeholders have to be determined not by calculating the
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potential of opportunities provided by the environment, but by concrete assess-
ments of affordable loss in pursuit of vaguely promising courses of action to
fabricate new opportunities. As one cannot avoid negative surprises in the pur-
suit of positive ones, one key to effectual action consists in failure management.
The effectuator seeks to design intelligent failures that can be locally contained
and contribute to his/her learning, and continually pushes forward a series of
small successes that can be cumulated over time.
Effectuators act as though the environment were largely endogenous to their
actions. While fully acknowledging external constraints on their actions, effectua-
tors divide the event space into controllable and uncontrollable parts. They then
focus on what they can control to reshape the environment. They do not assume
opportunities to be pre-existent in the environment; instead they seek to fabricate
them. They also tend to ignore searching for pre-existent competitive threats,
because they themselves do not know which markets or event spaces they will end
up constructing. Organism and environment are inextricably intertwined in this
worldview and the focus always is on creating new possibilities with extant means
at any given instant.
What Difference Does an Effectual Approach Make?
What difference does it make that organizations are designed using an effec-
tual logic that keeps in focus the concurrent designing of the environment?
Furthermore, as a new organization transforms extant realities into new mar-
kets, in what ways can it continue or change its stance toward the environ-
ment? A review of the literature on strategic management and organizational
design shows that there are three prevailing approaches to design problems:
planning, adaptive and visionary. These underlying approaches differ in
whether and how they address uncertainty, goal ambiguity and isotropy that
characterize the organizational design space for a firm like Starbucks. Figure
1 from Wiltbank et al. (2006) arranges these approaches based on their ori-
entation toward two underlying variables — prediction and control — and
shows where an effectual/transformative approach differs in its logical 
orientation from the other three.
According to Figure 1, organizational designers have four logical options:
1 They can assume the environment is beyond their control and predictable,
investing in predictive techniques that allow them to design an organization
favorably positioned for the future: we call these planning approaches.
2 They can assume the environment is unpredictable, shorten their planning
horizons and invest in flexible organizational designs that effectively
respond to changes in the environment: we call these adaptive approaches.
3 They can assume that the environment is predictable but malleable and
impose their vision of the future, shaping the environment to achieve their
desired outcomes: we call these visionary approaches.
4 They can assume future environmental factors are contingent on human
action and design, and seek to create them through interactions with others
340 Organization Studies 29(03)
 at WILLAMETTE UNIV on January 8, 2009 http://oss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
including committing to imagined new futures viable out of current means:
we call this effectual transformation.
The purpose of the framework in Figure 1 is to help us investigate the crucial
question of what difference it makes that the design of organizations also
involves the design of environments. We undertake this investigation by com-
paring and contrasting the four design approaches by constructing alternative
(imagined) histories for Starbucks. The notion of alternative histories is a rela-
tively new analytical tool, but it has deep roots both in the philosophical tradi-
tion of using thought experiments and in mathematical simulation techniques
(Folger and Turillo 1999). Simon (1998: 244–5) too urged economists to use
alternate histories (à la ‘What would have happened had Cleopatra’s nose been
a quarter-inch longer?’) to develop and test time-dependent theories, as opposed
to time-invariant ‘laws’ of economics. The basic idea of alternative histories is
that the actual history of an organization such as Starbucks is one of many pos-
sible histories: it is a ‘sample’ existence that can be considered in comparison
with other alternative histories that Starbucks might have lived out. So, if we go
back in time, and pick any one moment, we can construct alternatives to the
actual history Starbucks experienced. Consider, for instance, the moment
Horward Schultz acquired Starbucks in 1987.
The acquisition of Starbucks by Howard Schultz (with the assistance of his
trusted lawyer, Scott Greenburg; more on that in a moment) was a key juncture
in Starbucks’ history. Schultz acquired Starbucks for $4 million and combined
it with his then current venture, Il Giornale, resulting in a coffee bean and 
beverage provider with nine retail outlets. Atop reliable demand for premium
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coffee and beans in the Seattle area, the business plan articulated growth to 125
stores within five years for the new combined venture. Starbucks brought
Schultz new means beyond additional retail presence: a coffee roasting plant, a
mail order catalog for the distribution of coffee beans and related infrastructure.
In Schultz’s own words:
‘Scott placed on the table between us the business plan, a hundred page confidential doc-
ument we had used for the private placement. On its cover were the two logos of Il
Giornale and Starbucks. We had written it with meticulous care, spelling out clearly
everything I intended to do with Starbucks once Il Giornale bought it. The plans had
been our bible for months, and now it had come to life. It was a thrilling moment, the
kind you can’t believe you are living through. Scott lifted his coffee cup in a toast, his
eyes sparkling. “We did it,” we said at the same time.’ (Schultz and Yang 1997: 100)
This moment when Howard and Scott agreed, ‘We did it’, is the moment we use
to separate out the actual future of Starbucks into our four imagined histories
based on the framework in Figure 1. The following four narratives illustrate four
hypothetical histories.
Alternate History #1 Based on a Planning (or Causal) Logic
The US market for gourmet coffee was a $400 million niche in 1987.
Projections placed market size at $1 billion by 1994. The planning approach to
design suggests meticulous implementation of infrastructure and expansion
organized to meet the projected growth in demand in order to capture additional
share of the premium coffee market. A planning orientation would not question
the necessity of targeting the premium coffee market. Any refinements to the
model would manifest at a more specific level. What management skills are
necessary for Starbucks to mirror or outpace the projected market growth? What
internal information systems and physical infrastructure will be necessary, and
at what specific points in the growth cycle? How can Starbucks more efficiently
deliver premium coffee to an ever-larger customer base? Such questions would
consume the team in a planning approach to Starbucks.
This brings us to what kind of an organization a Starbucks designed under
a planning logic might look like. Optimized for a specific predicted future, a
planning approach should outperform other approaches, given the predictions
are correct; but such a design strategy risks expensive failure if the predictions
turn out wrong. As the planning organization constantly designs for market
growth in the gourmet coffee business, it stands ready to capitalize on the
growth when it comes. But what if an unexpected contingency had dramati-
cally affected the US premium coffee market? Imagine, for example, that a
new variety of tea from Korea took the US beverage market by storm, siphon-
ing off much of the demand growth for premium coffee; or perhaps
McDonald’s acquires Peet’s, emerging as the dominant competitor in the pre-
mium coffee market; or, that a health scare concerning the widespread emer-
gence of coffee-related health problems destroys the growth prospects of the
coffee industry? With a myopic focus on gourmet coffee projections,
Starbucks might have planned itself into a corner, leading to a potentially cat-
astrophic failure.
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Alternate History #2 Based on an Adaptive Logic
The vast majority of coffee consumed in the US market in 1987 was instant cof-
fee or inexpensive canned ground coffee. Based on an adaptive approach, ques-
tions driving organization design would revolve around how the firm can
reactively position itself within an established but changing environment.
Where do consumers buy coffee today? How do consumers prepare coffee
today? Who are the current and expected players in the competitive landscape
for beans and beverages, and how can we win additional market share from
them? The adaptive version of Starbucks’ history would produce an artifact dra-
matically different from the one we know today. What customers wanted in
1987 was premium instant Starbucks coffee on the shelves in grocery stores. An
adaptive approach would have given them that. It would have resulted in
Starbucks refocussing its business around grocery sales, not retail outlets. The
key question an adaptive history draws us to is whether the premium coffee
market we know today would have come to exist at all if Starbucks had
designed its organization to be adaptive. This results in an interesting revision
to one of the most famous arguments for the learning benefits of adaptation,
which Mintzberg drew from Pascale’s Honda story (Mintzberg 1996; Pascale
1996). According to Mintzberg, Honda planned badly, but learned well. The
result was a new market in the US for small motorcycles. But what if Starbucks
had learned well? What if Starbucks was well managed with regard to adapta-
tion? The premium coffee market as we know it today would probably not exist.
Alternate History #3 Based on a Visionary Logic
Even prior to Howard Schultz joining or later buying Starbucks, the product
vision for Starbucks was to deliver the rich, dark-roasted European coffee expe-
rience to the US market. Starbucks designed exclusively to a visionary strategy
would be a purist institution. A long list of questions would not even be open to
conversation among Starbucks managers under a visionary design approach;
they would simply be rejected by an organization designed to strictly fulfill
Schultz’s original vision. Would Starbucks offer non-coffee products? No. If
this was the case then Starbucks’ successful joint venture with Dreyer’s into
Starbucks-branded ice cream products would have never occurred. Would
Starbucks have experimented with new beverages that did not meet the vision
of the management team? No. Then the firm’s astonishingly successful joint
venture with Pepsico to produce and market iced Frappuccino drinks (which
proved wildly popular in the US and parts of Asia) would have never been
brought to fruition. Would Starbucks have allowed individuals other than
Starbucks ‘partners’ to prepare and dispense Starbucks products and more gen-
erally the Starbucks experience? No. Then Starbucks coffees would not be
available in US grocery stores, thus denying the firm economies of scale and
scope in its sourcing, roasting and distribution operations.
Starbucks would not be available in airports, hotels or anywhere else where the
company could not directly manage the store operation (these sites are licensed to
master franchisees globally). Starbucks still would not offer flavored syrup in cof-
fee, or any low-fat alternatives to whole milk, let alone soy products or chai
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(Schultz and Yang 1997). Under this visionary scenario, Starbucks might have a
higher satisfaction rating with a hardcore customer niche. The brand might be
more exclusive but probably a lot less valuable. And thus the firm’s market envi-
ronment would be notably different because many recent innovations in the US
coffee market have been results of Starbuck’s enterprise, and not its drivers.
Alternate History #4 Based on a Transformative (or Effectual) Logic
At inception, Starbucks was created with a transformative approach. While iso-
lated specialty providers of premium coffee existed prior to Starbucks, reliable
demand for premium coffee in Seattle had not been established. But once the
model proved repeatable, Schultz and his associates were able to take their
results to investors and attract money for expansion. What would Starbucks
have looked like had Shultz adopted a thoroughgoing transformative approach
to organization design? He would have begun by assessing his means. On the
date of the merger, new means of expert roasters, bean roasting equipment,
additional retail outlets, a new brand, additional people all with expertise, and
sheer critical mass all became newly available. Using a transforming approach,
he and his team would have begun asking different questions — predomi-
nantly, what else can we do with the means now available to us? What can we
do today that we could not do yesterday? How might our means be combined
in new ways to create new artifacts? What potential partners are knocking on
the door to expand our set of means and our opportunity set? And more gener-
ally, how can we impact the future in ways valuable to our stakeholders and
what they care about?
The imagined history of a transforming Starbucks would include even more
creativity than the firm has exhibited in the ‘real’ history we know. More exper-
iments, some of which fail, but none of which fail at a magnitude that threatens
the organization; and others, successful, but taking the organization in some
completely different directions. Artifacts created through these questions could
range from the mundane to the amazing. Jerry Baldwin, a founder of Starbucks,
was also a founder of the Red Hook Microbrewery. Perhaps Starbucks would
have created alcoholic coffees and liquors. Given the Italian connection with Il
Giornale, Starbucks might have become an importer of other Italian lifestyle
products such as kitchenware and household furniture. Starbucks might even
have gotten into the music business as a result of customer attraction to the
atmosphere created in the retail outlets. Perhaps it would have launched other
ventures to leverage consumer attractiveness of ‘third places’ (Oldenburg 2002),
ending up as the largest chain of bars in the US.
Back to the Actual History of Starbucks
The Starbucks we see today is an artifact of organizational design that includes
varying degrees of all four elements. Planning was an important element, but so
was transformation. In fact, in Starbucks today, coffee liquor, Italian pottery and
kitchen utensils, and a variety of jazz, acoustic and custom-designed CDs, are
all part of the business mix.
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The major assumption driving the four hypothetical accounts above is that
Starbucks and its environment do, and did, interact with each other in important
ways. Therefore, different Starbucks designs result in different organizational
environments. Organization and environment roll backwards and forwards into
each other in an interactive and iterative process, with the ‘visible’ artifact
design being constantly refined and redefined at the interface between its inner
environment and its external environment. Alternate histories conspicuously
highlight the interaction between different organizational designs and different
market designs. By exploring these alternatives, we can see that it mattered how
Starbucks chose to approach organization design.
Research Implications
Several authors in the field of organization design have suggested that the field
should be more concerned with practice-relevant construction principles and
design rules and less concerned with descriptive theory-building. Effectuation
represents one such set of principles ‘field-tested and grounded’ in the practice
of entrepreneurial expertise (Van Aken 2004: 219). This bundle of rules specif-
ically deals with emergence, i.e. work in generating new possibilities (Garud 
et al. 2006: 277). Effectuation may be called a logic because it is a coherent
system of principles that are inherently interrelated, internally consistent and
collectively independent (i.e. do not rely on ad hoc outside assumptions). It fits
in spirit with Romme and Endenburg’s (2006: 287) argument in favor of coher-
ent systems of construction principles, and Brusoni and Prencipe’s (2006)
emphasis on design rules as principles that define and allocate various functions
within systems of modules. And finally, it exemplifies Worren et al.’s (2002)
notion of pragmatic validity in that the principles of effectuation have been
found by expert entrepreneurs to pass the test of ‘will it work?’ rather than just
whether it is valid or true in a theoretical sense only (Romme 2003: 558). In
sum, effectuation is not merely a theory, i.e. a statement about the truth or oth-
erwise of a phenomenon in the world. It is also an internally consistent set of
ideas that forms a clear basis for action upon the world.
The ideas we have presented in this paper present several opportunities for
future research, both in organizational studies and in design science methods.
There is at least one major avenue for synthesis between effectual entrepre-
neurial practice and findings in organizational design studies. And that has to do
with the ‘lock-in’ effect discussed by Boland and Collopy (2004) in terms of liq-
uid and crystallized states. Romme and Endenburg (2006) found evidence of
this in their study of circular design. We suspect a similar moment of crystal-
lization occurs in the development of a new venture into a large and bureau-
cratic organization, in other words a ‘successful’ company. The term ‘lock-in’
refers to the fact that early choices in the design process end up constraining
later possibilities in the development of the project or venture. The history of
entrepreneurship abounds with anecdotal evidence of this lock-in effect. It is
argued, for example, that most high-potential new ventures fail not due to mis-
management or lack of resources or market changes, but due to a falling out
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between founding partners. Early partnership agreements often create bound-
aries that limit later growth possibilities. Venture capitalists therefore end up fir-
ing founders in the attempt to break out of these boundaries. It would be
interesting to compare venture capital practice with management practices in
design projects similarly struggling with lock-in effects.
Another modest contribution we hope to have made through this paper has to
do with the use of alternate history methodology in the organizational design
setting. We believe that the very notion of ‘design’ lends itself naturally to the
use of alternate history as a research tool. Since design invariably has to do with
open-ended possibilities rather than choice between pre-set alternatives, design
can almost always be operationalized as the crook from which the tree of
history can branch out in a wide variety of ways. Tracing out relevant paths not
traversed instead of confining research to the one ‘true’ history that actually
happened could be a very useful tool in developing valuable design criteria and
to connect them in meaningful ways to relevant consequences of interest both
in theory development and practice. Sometimes, the dog that did not bark is the
most valuable clue in solving the mystery.
Scholars embracing a design science approach to organizational studies rec-
ognize the importance of putting together organizational ‘science’ with organi-
zational ‘practice’ in a rigorous yet useful manner. Our effort in this paper has
been to provide an instance of such a fertile collaboration in the new venture
setting. It turns out here that the designers of entrepreneurial artifacts not only
design new firms, they also design new environments. And when they succeed
as designers of lasting ventures, they often end up designing the very environ-
ments we live in. And through the design principles they employ they some-
times rebuild the very coordinates of our existence: who we are and who we can
become; what we know and what we can learn; whom we interact with and
whom we can find no time for.
A design approach to organizational science in this setting, therefore, is par-
ticularly crucial not only in highlighting current practice, but also in helping
formulate pedagogical endeavors to shape the future of designs and designers
alike.
We would like to acknowledge the assistance of the Darden Foundation, Batten Institute, Anil
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1 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing to the distinction between effectuation
and the concept of abduction, which is widely used in the literature on design (Warfield 1994;
Margolin and Buchanan 1995). Abduction is inference to the best explanation of a set of facts
(Josephson and Josephson 1994; Walton 2005). We think abduction is a cognitive operation
that may be related in some ways to the literature on entrepreneurial discovery (Kirzner 1997).
Effectuation, on the other hand, is fundamentally premised on action: it is a logic for a stream
of actions the entrepreneur undertakes.
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